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DEFENSIVE DEFENSE LAWYERING OR DEFENDING
THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER
FROM THE CLIENT*
John Wesley Hall, Jr. **
We have all heard of the assault on the independence of the crim-
inal defense bar usually manifested by prosecutors subpoenaing law-
yers to be witnesses on fee information,' issuing search warrants for
lawyer's offices,2 and by sending cooperating and wired codefendant-
and witness-informants into lawyer-client meetings to gather informa-
tion about the defense.3 A 1985-86 study for the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) showed that a substantial
percentage of criminal defense lawyers justifiably feel that they are
targets of investigations and prosecutions.4
This article addresses the underlying problems from this last
form of the assault on the independence of the criminal defense bar,
using defendants, codefendants, and witness-informants against the
criminal defense lawyer. This form of assault is far more intimidating
* Copyright by the author. Used by permission. Originally presented at the Second
Annual John Dice Criminal Defense Seminar of the Memphis and Shelby County Bar
Associations, Memphis, Tennessee, October 8, 1988.
** Sole Practitioner, Little Rock, Arkansas. President, Arkansas Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers (1987-89); Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little
Rock School of Law.
Author, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Lawyer (LCP-BW 1987); Search and
Seizure (LCP-BW 1982, 2d ed. 1989); Trial Handbook for Arkansas Lawyers (LCP-BW 1986).
Authors usually feel uncomfortable citing themselves, and this is no exception. I do,
however, want those readers whose curiosity is piqued by this talk to look things up.
1. J. HALL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAWYER § 11.1 (1987)
[hereinafter, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY] (citing, inter alia, Genego, Risky Business: The
Hazards of Being a Criminal Defense Lawyer, 1 CRIM. JUST. 2 (1986)).
2. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, § 11.10.
3. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d
486, vacated, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1983); United States v.
Rispo, 460 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1972).
4. The NACDL study showed that 80% of the criminal defense lawyers responding to
the survey felt that the "Department of Justice has intentionally adopted a practice of investi-
gating and prosecuting attorneys who represent defendants in criminal cases as a means of...
discouraging zealous representation of criminal defendants." Genego, Reports from the Field:
Prosecutorial Practices Compromising Effective Criminal Defense, 10 THE CHAMPION (No. 4)
7, 12, 15 (May 1986).
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in its impact on defense lawyers because the stakes are much higher
and it is so much more insidious in its nature.
Most lawyers are unaffected by the horror stories of misconduct
I will discuss because they would never even think about doing some-
thing that would get them in ethical or criminal trouble. There are a
substantial number of lawyers in this country, however, who practice
on the "edge" of misconduct. They are the primary targets of this
article. Nevertheless, every criminal defense lawyer should consider
the implications here which affect us all.
I. THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM
The source of this particular problem is the criminal defense law-
yer's client.. Clients sometime figure out, or are told, that they can cut
themselves a better deal with the government if they can trade their
lawyer for themselves. This is, I submit, a forgotten area of lawyer-
client relations. The lawyer risks suspension from the practice of law,
disbarment, indictment, conviction, imprisonment, and maybe even
some public humiliation.
The first three rules of a successful and ethical criminal defense
practice are: (1) get the fee in advance; (2) the lawyer should not be
the one to go to jail; and (3) always be fair and honest to the client,
the court, your opponent, and yourself.' This article addresses the
second and third rules.
How do you protect yourself from this situation? It is easier than
you might think: Always remember rules two and three. Stated an-
other way, you better know and understand the laws dealing with
obstruction of justice and subornation of perjury. Your protection
begins with the first meeting with the client.
Lawyers may think they are practically immune from criminal
prosecution, but, believe me, they are not. The greatest risk of expo-
sure comes from the client and their friends, family, and witnesses to
whom you talk. It is foolhardy to think that the lawyer can tell the
client anything and remain insulated from a criminal defendant on
whose allegations one would think no police officer or prosecutor
would supposedly believe or rely.6
How do you deal with these people? It is simple, and the rule is
the reason: Say nothing or do nothing that you would be afraid or
ashamed to read in the newspaper some day. Stated more bluntly, if
5. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, § 1.10.
6. Id. § 5.33.
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the police or a grand jury listened to this conversation, what would
they think?
You must treat every client and their friends, relatives, witnesses,
and codefendants as potential informants. You must deal at arms'
length with them at all times, and you must always consider the possi-
bility they are "wired" wherever you talk to them, be it in jail, your
office, some other law office, or even in the courthouse. Treat all dis-
cussions with them as you would a conversation "on the record" with
a reporter.7
This may sound overly "Big Brotherish," but it is not. I am only
being pragmatic. The NACDL study showed that 39% of all crimi-
nal defense lawyers responding believed that the government had sent
a confidential informant into defense meetings or to them as a pro-
spective client. Several lawyers responding even believed that the
government informant tried to engage the lawyer in misconduct.' I
was one of those respondents. 9
Certainly there is risk of prosecution from overt statements and
conduct like "tell witness A to lie." Few of us would have sympathy
with a lawyer who said that. But, even honest lawyers are at risk if
they do not handle the client properly when it becomes apparent that
the client proposes something illegal. There is also risk of prosecution
if you or your client talk vaguely or in circles to avoid the obvious,
talk in code words, or drop hints, and by refusing to say "no" when
common sense and ethics require it.
When the client proposes criminal or unethical conduct, you
must respond immediately, firmly, and clearly that you will not do it
and you must explain why. Better yet, show the client a copy of the
relevant statute from the state or federal criminal or ethics code and
let the client read the statute while you tell them why what they pro-
pose to do is a crime for either of you, or unethical for you. '0 If you
hesitate and equivocate in your responses, someone listening to your
responses or reading a transcript of the conversation may mistake
your equivocation for acquiescence in the client's proposed criminal
conduct. That alone may be enough to get you indicted for obstruc-
7. Id.
8. Genego, supra note 4, at 13.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
10. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, § 5.33, at 144:
When a client acts as though he or she expects assistance not permitted by the
ethical rules, criminal law, or other law, the lawyer has a duty both to the system of
justice and to him or herself to advise the client in no uncertain terms that the lawyer
cannot give that assistance and [has a duty to explain] why.
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tion of justice or subornation of perjury."I
Rule 1.2(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, promulgated in
1983 and now the law in half the states, addresses this issue as if it is a
minor matter:
When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not per-
mitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer
shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on
the lawyer's conduct.
Rule 1.2(e) states the obvious even to the uninitiated among us. The
why and how is important, too, and that is what this article addresses.
The risk of indictment and prosecution exists even when you are
scrupulously ethical and lawful. When the client consults with a law-
yer about a crime in progress or a potential future crime, the lawyer
absolutely must be sensitive to the fact that the lawyer's advice, if
wrong, and maybe even when it is legally and ethically correct, could
subject the lawyer to investigation or indictment for being a conspira-
tor or accessory after the fact, for hindering prosecution, or for con-
cealing physical evidence. These are the most difficult questions
criminal lawyers ever face, and, when the problem arises, the lawyer
must consider his or her own potential criminal exposure. 2 When
circumstances require, or when you have any doubt at all, to quote
Nancy Reagan, "Just say no."
II. HANDLING THE PROBLEM
What do you do about these situations? Do you close your eyes,
ears, and mouth and let the client commit the crime hoping he does
not get arrested? Or do you counsel against it?' 3 Is your silence
enough to protect you from criminal liability? Does being a lawyer
and officer of the court impose a legal duty under the criminal law to
take affirmative action to prevent a crime from occurring?14
Witness Tampering: Your client says "Witness B is going to say
such-and-such about me. I'm going to talk to him and get him to not
be so positive against me. He knows the truth." Worse, your client
says "I'm going to show him why he needs to change his story." Or
worse, your client says "I'm going to pay him to shut up." Even
11. Id. n.9.
12. Id. at 145.
13. See infra note 27.
14. Here, I exclude test cases raising a bona fide question of the validity of a statute. See
Rule 1.2(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct; PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
1, § 5.33, at 144 n.6.
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worse, your client says "I'm going to kick his [and show
him who's boss]."
You must read the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)-(d). This Act is required reading for every
criminal defense lawyer appearing in federal court, and it will put the
fear of God in you.' 5 The Act provides in subsection (b) that intimi-
dation or misleading conduct toward a possible witness to "influence,
delay, or prevent" testimony or to withhold, alter, or destroy a "rec-
ord, document, or other object" is a felony.1 6 Subsection (c) of the
Act provides that intentional harassment of a possible witness to hin-
der, delay, prevent, or dissuade the witness from attending or testify-
ing at an official proceeding or reporting a violation of the law is also
a felony. 17
15. For you nonbelievers, make that the Department of Justice.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, or threatens an-
other person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to-
(1) influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official pro-
ceeding;
(2) cause or induce any person to-
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object,
from an official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the
object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;
(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or
to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been
summoned by legal process; or
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer
or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible
commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or
release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
(c) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, de-
lays, prevents, or dissuades any person from-
(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding;
(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States the
commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions
of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
(3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection with a Fed-
eral offense; or
(4) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation pro-
ceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecuting or proceeding; or
attempts to do so, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.
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"Misleading conduct" is defined in terms strikingly similar to the
federal securities fraud laws 8 as "knowingly making a false state-
ment," omitting information to cause a part of a statement to be mis-
leading, creating a false impression, or creating a false document or
other object which is to be relied upon by others.19
Under prior law, the government had to prove that the defendant
had a corrupt motive.20 Now, the government need only prove that
the defendant sought to influence testimony. This statute considera-
bly lessens the government's burden of proof.2 ' In addition, the sec-
tion on misleading conduct will put the onus on lawyers to be
straight-forward and honest with all witnesses or be guilty of a fel-
22ony. Now it is only an affirmative defense that the purpose of the
defendant was to get the witness to tell the truth.23 That is, you can
have the purpose of bringing forward the truth and still be guilty of a
felony under this statute.24 In fact, a lawyer in California was in-
dicted under this statute for telling witnesses, for example, that they
did not have to talk to government officers without consulting a law-
yer. Since lawyers have a right to tell people such things, how chilling
will the threat of prosecution be to zealous advocacy?
Subornation and Perjury: Your client says he has a witness who
18. It has been noted that this section closely follows federal securities fraud laws. Jef-
fress, The New Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1984).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1986) provides as follows:
[T]he term "misleading conduct" means
(A) knowingly making a false statement;
(B) intentionally omitting information from a statement and thereby causing a
portion of such statement to be misleading, or intentionally concealing a material
fact, and thereby creating a false impression by such statement;
(C) with the intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting reliance on a
writing or recording that is false, forged, altered, or otherwise lacking in authenticity;
(D) with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting reliance on a
sample, specimen, map, photograph, boundary mark, or other object that is mislead-
ing in a material respect; or
(E) knowingly using a trick, scheme, or device with intent to mislead.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333-35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 834 (1978); Knight v. United States, 310 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1962).
21. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, § 21.9.
22. Id. § 21.10.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d) (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an affirmative defense, as to
which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention
was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully.
This section does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof. United States v. Clemons,
658 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 97
(1988); United States v. Kalevas, 622 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
24. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSlBLITY, supra note 1, § 21.10.
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can prove that he did not commit the crime. This witness comes into
your office, and you question him. Initially you feel that this witness
is probably lying, but you are not sure, and logically, you suspect that
your client is attempting to suborn perjury. By the time trial comes
around, you know beyond a reasonable doubt that this witness is ly-
ing. Do you put him on the stand even when you feel the prosecution
cannot contradict the witness?
Initially, when you merely believe that the witness is probably
lying, you do not commit a crime or ethical violation by putting the
witness on the stand, and, in fact, you have an ethical duty to put the
witness on the stand. I submit that it is not the lawyer's place to
decide whether a witness is lying unless the lawyer has an actual belief
beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness is lying.2" If you know in
your own mind that the witness is lying, you have an Obligation not to
promote the perjury. You must decline to put the witness on the
stand or limit their testimony to truthful matters. If you do promote
perjury, you could be disciplined or even prosecuted for promoting or
advancing the perjury. 6
Taking the Proceeds of Crime: Suppose your client, wanted for a
bank robbery, comes into your office to retain you and pay a fee. He
produces stacks of bills with money wrappers from the bank that was
robbed. Or worse, the client produces money with red dye on it. In
either case, do you take it? NO.2 7
Similar situation: The client tells you that he is to be indicted in
a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE)2" or racketeering (RICO)29
case and the charges will include allegations that he made hundreds of
thousands of dollars as a drug dealer. He offers you a $100,000 re-
tainer in cash. Do you take it?
Some of us say that the presumption of innocence applies not
only to the defendant but also to his money. Do you have a duty to
ask about the source of money? Should you remain consciously igno-
25. Id. § 24.6. See United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1988).
26. Id. Ch. 23.
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (Supp. IV 1986) (discussed in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, supra note 1, § 25.7).
A lawyer in Tennessee was convicted of taking the proceeds of a bank robbery in such a
case in United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
An Arkansas lawyer was convicted in federal court of, inter alia, conspiracy to commit
bank robbery for taking red dyed money received from his client-co-conspirator. His downfall
likely came when he deposited the red dyed money into his own bank account. United States
v. Probst, 792 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1986) (later appeal).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. IV 1986).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (Supp. IV 1986).
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rant?3° If you thought the witness tampering statute was bad, you
should see the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.31 All crimi-
nal defense lawyers must be fully aware of this Act. The Act makes it
a crime to take money from a person knowing that the money came
from certain violations of federal law including drug crimes, CCEs,
RICO violations, bribery, bank crimes, and others.32 The former
Meese Administration of the Department of Justice had stated in
meetings with officials of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers in 1987 and 1988 that lawyers will not be held to the
same standards as other recipients of the proceeds of crime in recogni-
tion of the client's need to obtain counsel of choice and the fact that
lawyers should not be forced to inquire into the source of funds. In
addition, the government, on several occasions, has been willing to
waive possible forfeiture of attorney's fees in RICO cases.33
30. 1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 14.09 (3d ed. 1977):
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that
a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious
to him. A finding beyond reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid enlight-
enment would permit an inference of knowledge. Stated another way, a defendant's
knowledge of a fact may be inferred from willful blindness to the existence of the
fact.
It is entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate closing of the eyes,
and the inferences to be drawn from any such evidence. A showing of negligence or
mistake is not sufficient to support a finding of willfulness or knowledge.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (Supp. IV 1986) (discussed in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, supra note 1, § 6.15).
32. The list in § 1956(c)(7) is actually much longer. It includes:
offense[s] under section 152 (relating to concealment of assets; false oaths and claims;
bribery); section 215 (relating to commissions or gifts for procuring loans), any of
sections 500 through 503 (relating to certain counterfeiting offenses), section 511 (re-
lating to securities of States and private entities), section 543 (relating to smuggling
goods into the United States), section 641 (relating to public money, property, or
records), section 656 (relating to theft embezzlement, or misapplication by bank of-
ficer or employee), section 666 (relating to theft or bribery concerning programs re-
ceiving Federal funds), section 793, 794, or 798 (relating to espionage), section 875
(relating to interstate communications), section 1201 (relating to kidnapping), sec-
tion 1203 (relating to hostage taking), section 1344 (relating to bank fraud), section
2113 or 2114 (relating to bank and postal robbery and theft) of this title [18], section
38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778), section 2 (relating to criminal
penalties) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401), section
203 (relating to criminal sanctions) of the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), or section 3 (relating to criminal violations) of the Trading
with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 3).
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
33. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (Supp. IV 1986) (discussed in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, supra note 1, §§ 6.15-.16). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 6182, signed by the President on November 18, 1988, exempts from coverage under § 1957
monetary transactions "necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed
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Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence with respect to
money is overcome in the previous examples on the bank robbery pro-
ceeds and the dyed money. The example of the apparent drug money
presents a closer question. You can probably accept it safely. If,
however, the client tells you that the money is the proceeds of crime,
you would be wise not take it. Why? What happens if the client later
tells the police that you knew that the money was proceeds of a
crime? What will the police do?34 Tell the client to come back with
some "clean" money, and you will welcome him with open arms.
Lawyer as Participant: Suppose the client comes in and says he
has a kilo of cocaine and $50,000 in his safe deposit box. The client
wants advice about what to do with it before the police, who are likely
already suspicious, obtain a search warrant.
Any advice you give in this situation could very well be unethical
or criminal or get the client arrested. The client is in unlawful posses-
sion of drugs at the time. You must be careful to avoid possession
yourself. If you advise the client to move the drugs, you are guilty of
a crime.35 If you move the drugs yourself, you are guilty of a crime.36
If you advise the client to leave it there and abandon it, bank officials
will eventually find it and they will surely tell the police.
I once had a walk-in client ask such a question. The first ques-
tions that went through my mind were whether he was wired and
whether this was a sting. No matter what advice you give in this
situation, you could get in trouble. Tell the client you cannot give any
advice, explain why, and show them the door. 7
Tampering with Evidence: If the client brings you a murder
weapon, lays it on your desk, and asks you for advice about what to
do with it because he does not want it, what do you do? Should you
hold the gun in your safe and (a) promise you'll turn it over after trial
or (b) say you'll get rid of it?
In either case you could be charged with a crime. If you turn it
by the sixth amendment to the Constitution." Prosecution is still possible under § 1956 where
an attorney has a specific intent to launder money or promote some underlying criminal
activity.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977) (conviction of lawyer for receipt of proceeds of a bank robbery which the lawyer had
good reason to believe came from a bank robbery which the lawyer lied to the FBI about and
then destroyed; the client told the government about the money).
35. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (1982).
36. See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967)
(lawyer an accessory after the fact for moving evidence from his client's safe deposit box to
avoid possible seizure).
37. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, § 10.54, Hypothetical Case 3.
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over after trial, you would be tampering with evidence. If you get rid
of it, you would not only be tampering, but would also be an acces-
sory after the fact to the underlying crime. You may have a sixth
amendment defense to the former but not the latter. 8
Tax Difficulties: The client pays a $100,000 fee to the lawyer, but
the lawyer files no currency transaction report (CTR) and does not
deposit the money in the bank. The client tells the police about the
fee. A year later, the police check the CTR files and find that none
were filed by the lawyer or by the bank. The lawyer is probably guilty
of a crime.39 Later, the IRS conducts an audit and finds the money
unreported. The lawyer is probably guilty of tax evasion.'
The moral: You must report any cash fee because you never
know when the client will tell the police how he paid you.4 In filing a
CTR, a lawyer may be able to assert an attorney-client or self-incrimi-
nation privilege as to the client's identity,42 but there is no privilege as
to the amount of money received. As of yet, there is no privilege to
not file a CTR that at least provides most of the information.43
III. How DOES THE CLIENT DECIDE To TURN
ON THE LAWYER
The client's decision to "rollover" on the lawyer can come from
several sources. The client sometimes figures it out for himself or her-
self and then goes to the police. We all know of the common law
enforcement technique in which the first words to a drug courier or
low level dealer after "you're under arrest" are: "We'll help you get
out of this (or get leniency) if you help us get your source [higher-
ups]." Even though the client did not agree to help at first, he or she
may know the offer remains open up until final disposition of the case.
While preparing the defense, the lawyer can aggravate the situation
38. Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 514 A.2d 114 (1986), app. denied, 517
Pa. 589, 534 A.2d 769 (1987) (sixth amendment right to counsel protected counsel in that
situation from being charged since the evidence was actually produced at trial on demand, but
lawyers did not handle it very well at all, and they were lucky the appellate court helped them
out). Stenhach and like cases are discussed in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1,
§ 10.53.
39. See 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (Supp. IV 1986) and 26 C.F.R. § 1.60501-1 (1988) (discussed in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, § 6.14).
40. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201-07 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
41. Several years ago, a lawyer in the vicinity is alleged to have committed suicide shortly
after being confronted by the IRS about a substantial cash fee that he failed to report on his
income taxes. The IRS apparently learned about the fee from the client.
42. This is still an open question. It appears the IRS has rejected such claims of privilege.
43. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, § 6.14.
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DEFENSIVE DEFENSE LAWYERING
by doing or agreeing to do something questionable. The client later
contacts the police and wants to take the deal without the lawyer be-
ing involved (maybe the client knows of the lawyer's moral scruples
against rolling over on others"). On further questioning of the client
by the police, the police feel that the lawyer might obstruct justice or
suborn perjury. The police involve the prosecutor, and they all agree
that the client will go through with the trial but that no adverse judg-
ment will be entered. Instead, the client will be a government inform-
ant, and he will wear a "wire" to lawyer-client meetings and during
trial to gain incriminating evidence from the lawyer and others. In
effect, the government is willing to lose the underlying case to make a
case against the lawyer.
Sound far-fetched? Not at all. It has happened before. There is
a case pending in a North Carolina state court involving similar facts,
except the informant was a "friendly" defense witness in a DWI
case.45 The DWI defendant was acquitted on that charge with the
informant's allegedly perjured testimony, so the prosecutor charged
the DWI defendant with perjury and charged his defense lawyer with
suborning perjury. The prime evidence against them were tapes of
trial preparation sessions recorded by a police "wire" on the
informant.
There are other ways in which a client might turn on his lawyer.
If a client knows or thinks the lawyer is a crook and is incapable of
getting the deal that the police have offered, the client might try to
make the deal himself or herself. In addition, the police may go to the
client with the offer where the lawyer was not the prime target but
becomes one after all.
Defense lawyers might be able to sway juries with informant
credibility arguments, but these arguments have very little impact on
police and prosecutors when they make the decision to arrest or indict
a defense lawyer. Police and prosecutors know the informant is try-
ing to save himself or herself. That's the name of the game.
A few words about entrapment are in order. It is hard to prove
entrapment in a criminal case where police influence, or mere oppor-
tunity, works on "an ordinary law-abiding citizen."46 Justifiably,
courts have no sympathy for lawyers claiming entrapment. The de-
44. Such is the official position of the lawyers participating in the National Legal Commit-
tee of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML).
45. "Codefendant Recorded Conversations," Charlotte Observer, June 29, 1988, at lc, 4c.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383-84 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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fense of entrapment admits a violation of ethical standards, and it is
contrary to what lawyers are supposed to stand for and how they have
been trained to perform.4 7
IV. CONCLUSION
When I was a child, I was given the perception that criminal
defense lawyers were all crooked. On reflection, I found that this crit-
icism was aimed at only two or three lawyers in my small home town,
but the label of "criminal defense lawyer" was always pejorative and
it stuck in my mind that way, until I became one. To me as a former
nonlawyer, the line between criminal defendants and criminal lawyers
was always blurred.
Of course, I do not think about myself as being one of those bad
guys. As criminal defense lawyers, we are defenders of rights, the
Constitution, the presumption of innocence, and we seek to preserve
an effective system of justice that grants the accused a fair trial. I feel
47. In lawyer disciplinary proceedings, entrapment is no defense at all-it is tantamount
to a guilty plea. See, e.g., In re Porcelli, 77 Ill. 2d 473, 478, 397 N.E.2d 830, 832 (1979):
It would be difficult to imagine circumstances in which the defense of entrap-
ment would be available to an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding. Attorneys are
versed in the law and should be keenly aware of what activities constitute a breach of
the law. This knowledge is inconsistent with the central premise of entrapment, i.e.,
an implantation of criminal intent in the mind of an innocent person. (Sorrells v.
United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413.) Therefore, in only
the rarest of circumstances may an attorney label himself innocent and shield himself
with the defense of entrapment.
This is discussed in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, § 20.9 and Annot., 61
A.L.R.3d 357 (1975).
In criminal cases involving lawyer defendants, the question has not yet been discussed
quite this way. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1220-23 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974) (entrapment defense rejected and lawyer convicted of conspiracy,
obstruction of justice, and three counts of bribery); United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754, 762
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1974) (entrapment defense rejected in conspiracy to
bribe IRS agent case); United States v. Madda, 345 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1965) (entrapment
defense rejected in attempted bribery of federal prosecutor); State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89,
107-08 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132 (1981) (entrapment defense rejected in false
insurance claims case). Cf. Stoner v. State, 418 So. 2d 171, 180 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 418 So. 2d 184 (Ala. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1128 (1983) (claim of prosecutorial
delay over racially motivated church bombing which resulted in death of child; defendant was
an attorney, and if entrapment was believed to have been his defense at the time of the occur-
rence, he should have known he would ultimately be charged so he should have been contact-
ing witnesses long before).
I submit to you that a lawyer pleading entrapment in his own criminal trial is only endur-
ing a slow plea of guilty because the rationale of the disciplinary cases will ultimately make it
into a criminal case, and it probably should. Think about it. How can a lawyer argue entrap-
ment without proving his own guilt?
DEFENSIVE DEFENSE LAWYERING
good about what I do, and I am told that other criminal defense law-
yers also feel good about what they do.
Yet, I still think about those lawyers, and I occasionally read
about them in hometown newspapers at my parents' home. I wonder
why I felt that way about them. Are they really crooks? Extending
from that, what is the public perception of how criminal defense law-
yers handle cases? If criminal defense lawyers are reasonably success-
ful, is it ascribed by the public to their being crooked lawyers who will
sacrifice ethics and truth to win a case? Most police officers seem to
think that way about criminal defense lawyers, and, while most usu-
ally don't care what the police think, that perception likely motivates
the police to make targets of criminal defense lawyers.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
"A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds
of the Law." For some inexplicable reason, the 1983 Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct have no similar language. Do you ever wonder why?
Is zealousness a forgotten duty? By the same token, is integrity a
forgotten duty?
The NACDL study reported that some lawyers admitted that
they limited or eliminated criminal cases from their practice as a re-
sult of perceived indirect pressures from the Department of Justice.48
Who suffers? The clients and the lawyers don't suffer, because any
lawyer that weak and pliable has no business being a criminal defense
lawyer. As a group and as a part of the criminal justice system, crimi-
nal defense lawyers are better off without them. The system of justice
suffers because the government knows that its intimidation can work.
Far more is at stake here than gaining one little advantage in one
case. As criminal defense lawyers we must be certain that the line
between the lawyer and the client does not become blurred or ob-
scured as others perceive criminal defense lawyers-particularly those
with the power to do lawyers harm: police, prosecutors, and the
courts. Being zealous can and must include being honest and having
integrity. A criminal defense lawyer must never let anyone even think
that he lacks integrity or that he will act to prejudice the administra-
tion of justice.
Maintain this ideal and maybe criminal defense lawyers will be
safe from prosecution.
48. Genego, supra note 1, at 7.
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